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Abstract
TimothyWilliamson (1992, 224–5) and Ernest Sosa (1996) have ar-
gued that knowledge requires one to be safe from error. Something
is said to be safe from happening iff it does not happen at “close”
worlds. I expand here on a puzzle noted by John Hawthorne (2004,
56n) that suggests the need for two notions of closeness. Counterfac-
tual closeness is a matter of what could in fact have happened, given
the specific circumstances at hand. The notion is involved in the
semantics for counterfactuals and is the one epistemologists have
typically assumed. Normalized closeness is rather a matter of what
could typically have happened, that is, what would go on in a class
of normal alternatives to actuality, irrespectively of whether or not
they could have happened in the circumstances at hand. The distinc-
tion sheds light on recent apparent counterexamples to safety (Sz-
abó Gendler and Hawthorne, 2005, 315n14, Comesaña, 2005, Sosa,
∗Part of this material has been presented at a Virtue Epistemology workshop in Edin-
burgh in april 2009, and the paper was presented in the SoPhA congress (sept 2009) and in
the PhilEAs talk series (oct 2010) in Geneva and at the Graduate Philosophy Conference
in Oxford (oct 2010). I thank the audience on each occasion for helpful discussion, Pas-
cal Engel, John Hawthorne, Jesper Kallestrup, Anne Meylan, Duncan Pritchard, Ernest
Sosa and Timothy Williamson for detailed discussions, and the later for his comments at
the Oxford Graduate Philosophy Conference. The present version essentially dates from
august 2010 and barely addresses the problems and questions that were raised on those
occasions. A newer version is in preparation.
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2007, 31): they involve failure of counterfactual safety but not of nor-
malized safety. This suggests that normalized safety is the one that
guides intuitive judgements about knowledge. However, it is plau-
sible to think that counterfactual safety is the substantive property
the intuitions are tracking; if so, the intuitive judgements should be
rejected.
Peter Unger (1968) argued that one fails to know that p if it is a mere acci-
dent that one’s belief that p is true and diagnosed that Gettier and lottery
cases involve a violation of that condition. These views are now widely
shared, though there is still disagreement over the appropriate theoretical
framework for non-accidentality. Three main options have been explored:
something is accidental iff it is, in some relevant sense (a) unexplained,
(b) improbable, or (c) highly contingent. The topic of the present paper is
a promising and influential version of the modal approach (c): the safety
condition put forward by Timothy Williamson (1992, 224–5) and Ernest
Sosa (1996) according to which one knows only if one could not easily
have been wrong in a similar case.
The weak necessity modal in the safety condition is commonly repre-
sented in terms of “close” possible worlds. Here I expand on a puzzle
noted by John Hawthorne (2004, 56n) that suggests that we should dis-
tinguish two notions of “closeness”. Counterfactual closeness is a matter
of what could easily have happened in the specific circumstances at hand,
and can be thought of as proximity on a tree of branching time. The notion
is involved in the semantics for counterfactuals and is the one epistemolo-
gists have typically assumed. The second, normalized closeness, is a matter
of what would go on in a normalized class of alternatives to actuality, that
is, alternatives that are generated from actuality by some constrained re-
combination procedure, irrespectively of whether or not they could have
happened in the circumstances at hand. While counterfactual safety is a
matter of what could in fact have happened, normalized safety is rather a
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matter of what could typically have happened.
The distinction between counterfactual and normalized safety sheds
light on recent apparent counterexamples to safety (Szabó Gendler and
Hawthorne, 2005, 315n14, Comesaña, 2005, Sosa, 2007, 31). Such apparent
cases of unsafe knowledge involve failure of counterfactual safety but not
of normalized safety. This suggests that normalized safety is the notion
that guides intuitive judgements. However, it is plausible to think that
counterfactual safety is the substantive property the intuitions are track-
ing; if so, the intuitive judgements should be rejected.
1 Safety
In its most basic form, the safety condition states:
(BS) S knows that p only if S’s belief that p could not easily have been
false.
The condition is unsatisfactory on several counts, but it allows a more per-
spicuous exposition of our puzzle. (Refinements are postponed to section
4.)
The safety condition straightforwardly explains (1) why a lucky guess
is not knowledge; (2) why one cannot know in advance that a ticket in a
fair lottery is a looser, (3) why one fails to know in a range of Gettier cases.
1. If Leo guessed rightly that the coin would fall heads, his guess could
easily have turned out wrong.
2. If Max holds a ticket in a standard fair lottery, my belief that he will
loose could easily be false, no matter how low the odds of Max’s
winning are.
3. Consider Chisholm’s (1966) sheep case:
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Hidden Sheep Seeing a rock that resembles a sheep in the distance, Sharon
comes to believe that there is a sheep in a field. There happens to be
one, but it is hidden behind the rock.
The sheep could easily have failed to be there, inwhich case Sharon’s belief
would have been false.
The safety condition reaps these benefits without fueling scepticism,
at least at first sight. It is metaphysically possible, but could hardly be
the case, that all your experiences are artificially produced by a supercom-
puter. One could not easily be wrong on such matters (Sainsbury, 1997,
908). Thus safety does not support sceptical intuitions, and that is wel-
come to its proponents. (Of course that does not by itself advert scepticism
since safety is not claimed to be sufficient for knowledge.)
The consequences of safety are best seenwhen it is represented in terms
of the kind of ordering of possible worlds that is familiar from Stanlaker-
Lewis’ semantics for counterfactuals (Stalnaker, 1968; Lewis, 1973). We
assume a preorder of possible worlds in terms of closeness to actuality. We
further assume a threshold that divides worlds into those that are close
enough to actuality (henceforth, “close worlds”) and those that are not
(henceforth, “distant worlds”). We say:
Easy-possibility as closeness p could easily happen iff p is true at a some
close world.1
A state of affairs p is said to be an easy possibility iff it obtains at some close
world and a weak necessity iff it obtains at all close worlds. The notions are
1More formally: ￿x is a triadic relation over a setW of worlds such that for all w ∈W,
￿w is a preorder over W (￿w allows ties but no incomparabilities) with w as a minimal
element. Whenw￿ ￿w w￿￿ we say thatw￿ is closer tow thatw￿￿. R is a reflexive accessibility
relation over worlds such that for any w,w￿,w￿￿ ∈ W, if wRw￿ and w￿￿ ￿w w￿ then wRw￿￿.
When wRw￿ we say that w￿ is close to w, and the condition ensures that any close world
is closer than any non-close world. Finally, we introduce a weak necessity operator ￿
such that￿p is true at w iff p is true at any world w￿ such that wRw￿. We say that p could
easily happen iff ￿p.
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intended to capture ordinary claims about what could or could not easily
have happen.
According to (BS), knowledge is weakly necessarily true belief. Safety
is thus a restricted form of infallibility: one’s belief cannot be false at close
worlds. By requiring infallibility over all close worlds, the condition rules
out Gettier cases and lottery cases insofar as these cases involve a close
possibility in which one’s belief would be false. By requiring infallibility
across close worlds only, safety avoids fueling sceptical arguments inso-
far as those rely on distant possibilities of error. By contrast, a condition
that only requires avoidance of error at most worlds fails to block Gettier
cases and the lottery, and a condition that requires avoidance of error at all
worlds indiscriminately implies scepticism. Safety deals with both issues
by requiring avoidance of error at allworlds within a certain range.2
2 A puzzle for safety
Now the puzzle. For almost any Gettier case the safety condition handles,
one can build a variant where specific circumstances ensure that the belief
is safe yet no less accidentally true:
Shy Sheep As before, except that the sheep always hides behind this rock
— precisely because it has a sheep shape.
The circumstances ensure that there could not easily have failed to be
sheep behind the rock.3 Similarly (1) and (2) are intuitively true:
2Williamson (2000, 124) explicitly formulates safety as truth over all worlds within a
range. Some authors have instead required avoidance of error at most or nearly all close
worlds (Pritchard, 2005, 71, 163). That is unadvisable because the resulting condition fails
to account for Gettier and lottery cases (Greco, 2007, 301-2), and plausibly entails failure
of closure (Hawthorne, 2004, 145). Consequently Pritchard (2007, 292) has amended his
condition to require that one avoid error in “all very close” worlds. But the distinction
between “close” and “very close” seems simply to relabel the “close”/“distant” one.
3If needed, stipulate that local sheep are genetically bound to behave like that and
have moved to the area or survived in it precisely because of that trait, of which Sharon
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(1) There was hardly any chance that there would be no sheep behind
the rock.
(2) One could not easily have won a bet that there was no sheep behind
the rock.
Since there could not easily have failed to be a sheep there, Sharon could
not easily have been wrong. However, the intuition that she does not
know remains unaffected.
That is not a counterexample since safety was only claimed to be nec-
essary for knowledge. It is in principle possible that some other condition
explains Sharon’s failure to know. However, the similarity between the
cases (and the fact that one can build a continuum between them) puts
pressure on the safety condition: if some other condition explains the Shy
Sheep case, it will plausibly explain the initial case as well.
The reader will easily check that analogous variants can be built for
a wide range of Gettier cases. Anticipating on my diagnosis, I call them
abnormal safety cases.
3 Two notions of closeness
In abnormal safety cases, relevant possibilities of error are not “close”.
Christopher Peaococke (1999, 310, 321-3) provides a plausible character-
ization of the relevant notion of “closeness”: at a given time t, p is close
iff p would have resulted from a slight variation of the initial conditions.4
There are two sources of vagueness here: which variations are sufficiently
is unaware.
4See also Williamson (2000, 123-4). Peacocke (1999, 315) objects to using the same
closer-than order that underlies counterfactuals for closeness, but for reasons that seem
to me mistaken: he worries that the Lewis-Stalnaker ordering conjoined with determin-
ism will result in close worlds that make backtracking counterfactuals true, while the
ordering counts as closer worlds where small miracles have happened precisely in order
to avoid that result.
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small, and how far back in time are the “initial” conditions. These ap-
pear to be sensitive to subtle contextual matters and I can only give rough
guidelines. (1) as Peacocke argues (1999, 321), variations should hold ce-
teris paribus laws fixed and defeasibly keep fixed “robust” properties of
objects; (2) in the knowledge case, the relevant initial conditions are typi-
cally those obtaining not too long before the time of belief-formation or the
time relevant for the target proposition, depending which one is earlier.5
In the Shy Sheep case, these constraints deliver the verdict that there is no
close possibility in which Sharon’s belief is false.
The resulting structure can be laid out on a tree of branching time: at
each time t we open parallel branches corresponding to slight variations
of the conditions at t. A possibility p is close to w at t iff there is some
sufficiently close prior time t￿ where a p branch opens. More generally,
the later the last common node with a p branch is, the closer p is.6 The
resulting closness measure appears to be the relevant one for evaluating
counterfactuals.7 Call it counterfactual closeness.
John Hawthorne has already used an abnormal-safety case to point out
that counterfactual closeness is not the right notion for a safety-like condi-
tion on knowledge:
“For the purpose of epistemic evaluation, the epistemically rel-
evant notions of danger aren’t to be cashed out in terms of
any straightforward metric on objective risk, or any general-
purpose notion of metaphysical closeness at play in the discus-
5This comports well with Sturgeon’s (1993) point that whether some belief is knowl-
edge depends only on facts concerning times prior to belief formation — leaving cases
of multiple support aside. But when considering an historian’s knowledge we consider
variants of times long past.
6Note that while “w’ is close to w” is time- and possibly context-sensitive, “closer-
than” claims are not.
7For instance Lewis’ (1973) semantics (“if p would q” is true iff the closest p worlds
are qworlds), or von Fintel-Gillies’ one (“if pwould q” is true in context c iff ¬p∨ q holds
across all worlds that count as “close” in c) (von Fintel, 2001; Gillies, 2007). I remain
neutral on these.
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sion of counterfactuals. Suppose a demon protects X in such a
way that whenever X is in danger of forming a false belief, the
demon intervenes and stops the belief from being formed. X’s
belief-forming process up to that point might exactly resemble
that of Y, who does form a false belief. Here we are tempted to
claim that X does not knowwhen, but for the demon, he would
have formed a false belief in nearby worlds and, correlatively,
to speak of a ’danger’ or error, even though there is also a very
good sense in which the objective risk of X falling into error
was vanishingly low.”(Hawthorne, 2004, 56n)
However, most authors have (more often implicitly than not) relied on
counterfactual closeness.8 Williamson’s (2009) recent distinction between
“branching” and “close”worldsmay be seen as giving up the counterfactual-
closeness account, though it is not clear how he would apply it to abnor-
mal safety cases.
An obvious reply on behalf of safety is to argue that the no-sheep pos-
sibility is close in the Shy Sheep case even though it is not counterfactually
close. That requires the safety theorist to provide an alternative notion of
closeness.9 (She may or may not further hold that the alternative notion
also provide the right semantics for “could easily” claims.)
Here is the suggestion I want to examine here: the no-sheep possiblity
is relevant because it is a normal one. It would be perfectly normal for there
not to be a sheep behind the rock, even though that is weakly impossible
in the circumstances. Rather, it is the abnormality of the circumstances that
make some normal possibilities counterfactually distant. More generally,
8See Williamson’s (2000, 124) reference to Peacocke, Comesaña (2005, 399) and (2007),
Pritchard (2005, 47, 71), Sosa (2007, 25).
9By contrast, if one ends up with a set of relevant possibilities of error that cannot
be naturally seen as a “sphere” of possible worlds but rather as a set of unconnected
“islands”, we do not have a safety view in any recognizable sense. See Schaffer (2005,
125).
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the idea is that an alternative is normally close to actuality iff it is a suffi-
ciently similar variant of actuality that is at least as normal as actuality. I
call such variants “normalized” rather than “normal”, for they may be rel-
atively abnormal. Normalized safety is thus avoidance of error at normally
closeworlds.10
One expected feature of normalized is that it will be much less sensi-
tive to the specific background set-up of cases than counterfactual safety,
because normalized alternatives to various cases are likely to be similar to
each other. That seems to be closer to the way our intuitions about knowl-
edge behave.
Yet normality is a notably elusive notion, and I will attempt to put some
flesh on the bones of the suggestion (section 5). But let me first defuse the
potential worry that the abnormal safety puzzle calls for a more straight-
forward solution.
4 Sophisticated versions of safety and the puz-
zle
Basic safety is known to be unsatisfactory on several counts. (a) It fails to
exclude irrelevant possibilities of error in which one would have a false
belief on a different basis (Williamson, 2000, 128). (b) It is trivially satis-
fied by beliefs in necessary truths (Sosa, 2002, 275). (c) It cannot deal with
the fake-barn style of Gettier cases, in which relevant possibilities of er-
ror do not involve belief in the target proposition p but in a different one
10The idea that the relevance of possibilities of error depends on their normality can
also been found in Alvin Goldman (1986, 107) and John Greco (2003, 129–31). On Greco’s
explanationist view, abnormalities in the set-up trump the default salience of our faculties
in explaining why a belief is true. On Goldman’s view, the reliability of a process depend
on its success in normal (not normalized) worlds. For reasons of space I will not compare
the present view with theirs.
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(Hawthorne, 2004, 56n).11 The abnormal-safety puzzle may appear to be
an instance of (b)-(c); in this section I argue that it is not.
The three problems (a)-(c) can be adverted by replacing the safe-belief
condition with a safe-method one:
(MS) S knows that p only if one could not easily have formed a false belief
on the basis of the same method.12
To illustrate:
Prime numbers Primo has amistakenmethod for identifying prime num-
bers: he adds the digits and declares the number prime if the result-
ing sum is prime. I write “47” on a piece of paper.
Variant A: I ask him whether that number is prime.
Variant B: I ask him whether I have written a prime number.
Given that 4+7=11 is prime, Primo answers (rightly) “yes” in both
cases.
I could easily have written 49, and Primo would have falsely believed that
I had written a prime number. So Primo’s belief in variant B violates (BS).
However 47 could not easily have been non-prime, so Primo’s belief in
variant A satisfies (BS). (BS) thus imposes a surprising asymmetry between
the two variants. For intuitively, Primo fails to know for the same reason
in both cases: he uses a wrong method. (MS) captures the intuition: in
variant A, Primo could easily have formed the false belief that 49 is prime,
11A fourth problem is that possibilities of error include truth-valueless (instead of false)
belief (Hawthorne, 2002). That is solved by substituting non-truth to falsity; we leave the
amendment aside here.
12I will not argue the point here, but I think that safety should require that no one
could easily have formed a false belief on the same method. That deals for instance with
Gendler and Hawthorne’s Fake Bar case (2005, 338), in which three subjects use the same
method to detect whether their drinks are gin, but due to their respective habits only
one of them is confronted with the undetectable fake gin their favourite bar serves on
sundays.
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even though his actual belief could not easily have been false.13
Now it should be easy to see that the abnormal-safety puzzle arises
for method-safety just as it does for belief safety, only with slightly more
complex cases:
Safe prime numbers As before except that I pick up the numbers from a
list that, as a matter of weak necessity, contains only prime numbers
whose sums of digits is prime.
Now there is no counterfactually close possibility where Primo forms a
false belief on the same basis; yet he still fails to know.14 But here as well
normality could provide a solution: an alternative where the list would
contain other numbers is at least as normal as Primo’s actuality.
The diagnosis sheds light on two types of cases recently put forward
against safety. First, a range of cases straightforwardly fall into the abnormal-
safety category:
Protective angels A hidden agent or demon ensures that the subject can-
not form false beliefs via a certain method.
(See Hawthorne, 2004, 56n, Pritchard’s Temp case in Haddock et al.,
2010, chap. 3, Sosa, 2007, 29.)
While the angel prevents error at counterfactually close worlds, normal-
ized variants of actuality include worlds without angels.15
Second, if the normalized safety view is right, one expects cases in
which some possibilities of error are counterfactually close but not normally
13Sainsbury (1997, 908–9) proposes instead to construe “one’s belief” in a way that does
not keep the belief content fixed. Williamson (2000, 124) and Hawthorne (2004, 56) rather
formulate safety as avoidance of error in “similar-enough” cases; their condition is not
specific enough to distinguish respects pertaining to counterfactual closeness, normal-
ized closeness and methods. Sosa (2002, 279–80) adds a “guidance” condition such that
one must be guided by the condition under which one’s basis is safe for a given belief,
but it is not clear to me what the condition amount to.
14See also Sosa’s tomato-ripeness case (2002, 280).
15The diagnosis might also apply to cases involving “strange and fleeting” but safe
processes (Greco, 1999, 285-286) commonly used against reliabilism.
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close and in which we still ascribe knowledge. That is indeed what seems
to go on in apparent counterexamples to the safety conditions:
Lost supporter Wandering in an Italian city, Andy has just removed his
Man U cap because of the heat. He asks an apparently knowledge-
able woman if she will tell him where the station is. She answers
“yes” and proceeds to do so. However, she is an Intern Milan fan,
and if Andy had wore his cap, she would have answered the same
but sent him in thewrong direction. (Variant of Comesaña 2005, 397.)
Hallucinogenic cocktails Picking up a glass at a cocktail party, you go
to the next room and recognize your mother. However, most of
the other glasses on the tray contained an hallucinogenic drug that
would have made anybody looked to you like your mother.
(See also Gendler and Hawthorne’s (2005, 351n14) real daisies case
and Sosa’s (2007, 31) kaleidoscope case.)
Many are disposed to ascribe knowledge to both subjects, even though
their methods could easily have produced false beliefs. But the possible
worlds in which they do so are intuitively less normal than the actual one.
On the normalized safety account, such worlds are distant. Call such cases
abnormal unsafety cases.
5 Normally close possibilities
Can we flesh out an account of normalized alternatives that delivers the
advertised goods? Here is an attempt. Let the “area of interest” be the
space-time region of the world relevant to a certain knowledge ascription
we’re focusing on:
1. Normalized alternatives to w are variants of w: they are furnished
with the same kind of things at broadly the same locations. Give or
12
take some sheep, mountains or blades of grass, but do not rearrange
the molecules so that there is no sheep, grass nor mountains left.
Similarly, do not move things across wide distances in time or space:
no normalized variants of actuality have dinosaurs in Central Park
nor cheese on the Moon.
2. Normalized alternatives to w satisfy the basic laws of w, but for a
few exceptions that are kept as much as possible outside of the area
of interest.
3. Normalized alternatives to w do not breach ceteris paribus laws of w
more thanw does, especiallywithin the area of interest. If thewoman
does not normally lie, do not add a world where she does. (The rule
should probably be reinforced to apply to each law individually: an
actual abnormal dog does not allow you to introduce a normal-dog-
but-abnormal-liar alternative.)
4. Normalized alternatives to w do not have less natural properties that
are highly likely (by the lights of the laws of w) than w does, espe-
cially within the area of interest.16 If the world contains just 100 fair
coin tosses, do not add a world with a series of 100 heads; but if it
contains 2100 tosses, do so.
This is admittedly rough.17 Let me sketch how the account should be ap-
plied to abnormal unsafety cases. Here is a pair:
Absent Fake barns Oscar drives by the countryside, spots a barn in a field
and believes that it is a barn. There is similar-looking building on the
16The rule draws on Adam Elga’s (2004) account of typicality, itself based on Gaifman
and Snir’s Gaifman and Snir (1982) account of randomness. See also Robbie Williams
(2008, 408-9).
17And I do not recommend testing the account on worlds where what is normal differs
greatly from what is normal in ours. It is plausible that our intuitions are rigidly tuned to
what we take to be actually normal, and that they cannot be swiftly recalibrated.
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other side of the hill which Oscar cannot see from the road.
Variant A: the other building is a real one too. But earlier on, villagers
had tossed a coin to decide whether to build two fakes instead.
Variant B: the other building is a fake. Earlier on, villagers had tossed
a coin to decide on which side of the hill they would put it.
The possibility of error is equally counterfactually close in both variants:
namely, it would have resulted from an alternative outcome of the coin
toss. However, the error possibility in A involves a breach of a ceteris
paribus law (namely, that there are no fake buildings) that the actuality
in A does not breach. By contrast, in B, actuality itself breaches this law.
The fake barn possibility is thus a normalized alternative of B but not of
A. Correspondingly, there is more pressure to deny knowledge in B than
in A.18
Here is another test pair of cases:
Series of lotteries Variant A. I hold a ticket in each of nine small ten-ticket
lotteries.
Variant B. I hold a ticket in one big one-million-tickets lottery.
Assuming that you did not win each lottery in A, the possibility that you
did is less normal than the actual result by rule (4), even though it was
equally likely. By contrast, in variant B, the possibility that you win is
as normal as the actual result. This predicts our tendency to say that we
know that I won’t win every lottery in A, but we do not know that I won’t
in B.19
18See Szabó Gendler and Hawthorne (2005, 351n14) for such a verdict on a structurally
similar case.
19See Jonathan Vogel’s (1999, 165)Heartbreaker case.
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6 Should we opt for normalized safety?
Granting that normalized safety does guide our intuitive ascriptions of
knowledge, should we adopt it as a condition on knowledge? That is far
from obvious.
Counterfactual closeness goes with objective risk and chance. If a dan-
ger is counterfactually close, then however abnormal it may be, one is not
in a safe situation; and if a possibility has a high chance of obtaining, it is
counterfactually close, no matter how abnormal it may be. Now objective
risk, rather than normal risk, seems to provide adequate norm for actions.
For instance, driving one’s car after having had a drink at the hallucino-
genic coctkail party is wrong — though it may be excusable if one was
unaware of the risk. This is so even though one did not in fact take an
hallucinogenic drink and that hallucinations are not a normal possibility.
Aligning knowledge with normal safety rather than counterfactual safety
thus threatens to severe the intuitive role of knowledge as a norm for ac-
tion (Hawthorne and Stanley, 2008).
One can hardly avoid noticing that normalized safety looks very much
like a heuristic. It allows one to build a quick and dirty space of pos-
sibilities around actuality to evaluate the reliability of a given method,
whithout caring much about specific details of the set-up. That is most
useful when we are left in the dark, as we often are, about specific factors
in the set-up that affect the space of counterfactual possibilities. It also
plausibly makes it simpler to assess than counterfactual safety.20 More-
over, normalized safety will most of the time coincide with counterfactual
20Compare Lewis (1996, 563): “Why have a notion of knowledge that works in the way
I described? [...] I venture the guess that it is one of the messy short-cuts - like satisficing,
like having indeterminate degrees of belief- that we resort to because we are not smart
enough to live up to really high, perfectly Bayesian, standards of rationality. You cannot
maintain a record of exactly which possibilities you have eliminated so far, much as you
might like to. It is easier to keep track of which possibilities you have eliminated if you -
Psst! - ignore many of all the possibilities there are.”
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safety — normalized safety is safety over the kind of counterfactual space
one has in normal (most frequent) cases. This makes it plausible to con-
sider normal safety as a heuristic we use to track counterfactual safety.
The heuristic breaks down when the counterfactual close possibilities do
not match the normal ones.
It both ideas are right, we should maintain the counterfactual construal
of safety, and discard instead the intuitions that knowledge is incompati-
ble with abnormal safety and compatible with abnormal unsafety.
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